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MINIMALIST SOLUTION TO WILLIAMSON 
COUNTY 
RAYMOND J. NHAN∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton 
Bank of Johnson County relegated Fifth Amendment takings claims to 
a second-class of federal rights.  Before a takings plaintiff can sue in 
federal court, she must first seek compensation through an “adequate 
state procedure.”  Many federal courts have held that requirement to 
mean a takings litigant must first seek compensation through state courts 
if that state provides an inverse condemnation proceeding.  However, if 
a takings litigant sues in state court, she will be unable to sue in federal 
court because of issue preclusion.  This effectively shuts the federal 
courthouse door to many property owners.  Only two Supreme Court 
justices have shown any interest in revisiting Williamson County.  Thus, 
land use attorneys who are concerned about federal court access for 
takings plaintiffs should craft a case that would attract the Supreme 
Court’s attention.  This Article argues that land use lawyers should 
present the Court with a case in which the property owner has used a 
non-judicial procedure to seek compensation (such as asking for 
compensation from a county board).  The Court could then rule that 
such a non-judicial procedure is an “adequate state procedure” that 
satisfies Williamson County’s requirements.  This ruling would 
minimize the negative effects that Williamson County has wrought on 
takings plaintiffs. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1991, Leslie and Ben, a newlywed couple, purchased a quaint 
three-bedroom home in Pawnee, Indiana—a home in which they 
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hoped to raise a family.1  Leslie and Ben came to love Pawnee and the 
community.  When the empty lot across the street went up for sale in 
1994, they immediately purchased it as an investment property.  They 
hoped to use the investment proceeds to pay for their children’s college 
education. 
Fast-forward 20 years.  Leslie and Ben’s triplets were high school 
seniors, and they tried to sell their investment property so that they 
could use the proceeds to pay for their children’s educations.  While 
they were trying to sell their investment property, they learned that 
Pawnee passed a law, Ordinance 30, five years prior prohibiting all 
development of their investment property.  In other words, Ordinance 
30 denied Leslie and Ben all economically beneficial use of their land. 
Pawnee’s planning commission has an application process in 
which residents can request compensation for alleged regulatory 
takings.  Leslie and Ben thus went to the planning commission to try to 
receive compensation for the value of the property they had lost.  They 
submitted documents detailing the value of their property and how 
they purchased the property as an investment parcel.  The planning 
commission denied their request for compensation. 
Soon after, Leslie and Ben sued Pawnee, claiming that Ordinance 
30 caused a per se regulatory taking.2  Because Leslie and Ben hired a 
savvy lawyer, they brought their takings claim in Indiana state court.  
The lawyer was aware of Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, which requires such 
takings plaintiffs to ripen their case by seeking compensation through 
adequate state procedures,3 and how some circuit courts interpret 
“adequate state procedure” to mean seeking just compensation in state 
court before turning to the federal judiciary.4 
After Leslie and Ben sued in state court, Pawnee began engaging 
in gamesmanship.  Pawnee removed Leslie and Ben’s lawsuit to federal 
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which allows defendants to remove any 
claim to federal court if the case could have originally been filed there.5  
 
 1. Parks and Recreation (NBC Television Broadcast 2009-2015). 
 2. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (holding property owner 
suffers a taking when government enacts a regulation that denies all economically beneficial use 
of property). 
 3. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 
172, 194–97 (1985). 
 4. See, e.g., Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 354 n. 8 (2d Cir. 2005); 
Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87, 92–94 (1st Cir. 2003).  
 5. This example is based loosely off several actual cases. See, e.g., Sansotta v. Town of Nags 
Head, 724 F.3d 533, 545 (4th Cir. 2013) (town removing just compensation case from state court 
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Because the federal court had subject-matter jurisdiction based on the 
Fifth Amendment takings claim,6 the state court granted Pawnee’s 
motion to remove Leslie and Ben’s regulatory takings claim to the 
Southern District of Indiana. 
Two years after Pawnee removed Leslie and Ben’s takings claim 
to federal court, the city moved to dismiss the case as unripe because 
the couple had not litigated in state court, the adequate state procedure 
for obtaining compensation.7  The Southern District of Indiana agreed 
with Pawnee and dismissed Leslie and Ben’s takings claim as unripe, 
despite the case having been removed by the city from state court of 
federal court.8 
In a final salvo and at great expense, Leslie and Ben filed their 
claim in state court again.  This time, Pawnee litigated the issue through 
Indiana state court. At the end of the case, the Indiana state court 
denied Leslie and Ben’s just compensation claim.  Leslie and Ben then 
sought to return to federal court to litigate their now-ripe Fifth 
Amendment just compensation claim.  But the Southern District of 
Indiana invoked San Remo v. County and City of San Francisco, and 
held that issue preclusion applied to the state court litigation—which 
Williamson County required they endure.9 
After years of litigation, Leslie and Ben grew tired.  They resigned 
to the fact that they would never receive just compensation.  They gave 
up. 
 
 
Leslie and Ben’s story is not unusual.10  Williamson County has 
functionally barred property owners from accessing federal court.  
Indeed, Williamson County makes it very difficult for takings plaintiffs 
to access any court.11  Local governments engage in a procedural game, 
 
to federal court, then arguing case is unripe). 
 6. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
 7. Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 545. 
 8. In fact, courts have used Williamson County’s requirement to send cases to state court, 
even after the government removes a case, and agrees that jurisdiction is proper in federal court. 
See, e.g., Save More Food Mkts, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., No. 16-cv-447-jdp, 2016 WL 4131866 
(W.D. Wisc. Aug 3, 2016). 
 9. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 335 (2005). 
 10. See, e.g., Sansotta, 724 F.3d 533; Winer v. Clay Township, No. 3:15-cv-276, 2016 WL 
3676717 (S.D. Ohio July 6, 2016); Gelentt v. Township of Chapman, No. 4:15-cv-1910, 2015 WL 
7454757 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2015). 
 11. See Michael Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory Takings, 3 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 106-09 (2000) (hereinafter Bait & Switch) (explaining the Dodd 
Nhan - Macros (Do Not Delete) 2/15/2018  5:31 PM 
76 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXVIII:73 
like the kind that Pawnee used with Leslie and Ben, to prevent takings 
litigants from having their day before a judge. 
But in April 2016, takings plaintiffs received a welcoming sign.  
Though the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Arrigoni Enterprises v. 
Town of Durham, a case asking the Court to revisit Williams County, 
Justice Thomas dissented from denial of certiorari.12  In his dissent 
from denial, which Justice Kennedy joined, Justice Thomas noted that 
“the justification for Williamson County’s state-litigation requirement 
are suspect, while its impact on takings plaintiffs is dramatic.”13  He 
noted that Williamson County has inspired “gamesmanship” from 
lower courts14—like that which Pawnee used. Though the Supreme 
Court did not accept Arrigoni, some Justices are apparently aware of 
Williamson County’s shell game15 and are looking to overrule it.  
Coupled with Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in San Remo, 
which questioned Williamson County’s logic,16 property rights 
advocates may have cautious optimism that the Court will soon 
eliminate the state litigation rule. 
Now that some Justices have signaled their interest in revisiting 
Williamson County, property rights experts and jurisdictional mavens 
must present a “cert-worthy” case to the Court.17  Many considerations 
go into deciding whether a case is “cert-worthy,” such as identifying a 
circuit split,18 but many commentators have written about Williamson 
County’s incoherence and why the court should overrule it.19  Instead 
of asking the Court to overrule Williamson County, plaintiffs should 
provide the Justices an opportunity to make incremental changes.  
 
family’s and the Rainey brother’s struggle to get a court to hear their takings case). 
 12. Arrigoni Enters., LLC v. Town of Durham, 136 S. Ct. 1409 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from denial). 
 13. Id. at 1409 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See generally Michael Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There from 
Here: Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-
parody Stage, 36 URB. L 671 (2004). 
 16. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 17. Certainly, lower courts may take the same steps I propose the Supreme Court take to 
undo the damage that Williamson County has caused.  
 18. Evan Bernick, The Circuit Splits are Out There—And the Court Should Resolve Them, 
16 ENGAGE 36, 36 (2015) (“[Chief Justice John Roberts] emphasized that circuit splits are far and 
away the most important consideration in deciding whether to grant cert petitions.”).  
 19. See, e.g., Bait & Switch, supra note 11; Joshua D. Hawley, The Beginning of the End? 
Horne v. Dep’t of Agriculture and the Future of Williamson County, 2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
245, 245 (2015); R.S. Radford & Jennifer Fry Thompson, The Accidental Abstention Doctrine: 
After Thirty Years, the Case for Diverting Federal Takings Claim to State Court Under Williamson 
County Has Yet to Be Made, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 567, 612–13 (2015). 
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Justices prefer incremental changes to overruling cases.20  Therefore, 
the opportunity to make a narrow ruling would be more attractive to 
the Court. 
Thus, property owners should provide the Court with an 
opportunity to narrow Williamson County without overruling it.21  
Plaintiffs should present the Court with an opportunity to make a 
minimalist ruling that would modify Williamson County’s drastic 
consequences, and this Article explains how it can be done.  An ideal 
minimalist case would eliminate the ripeness-removal and Williamson 
County-San Remo traps that plagued Leslie and Ben.  By eliminating 
these two traps, the Court can ensure that takings litigants can have 
their cases heard in federal court. 
To accomplish this solution, this article proceeds in three parts.  
Part I lays out the history of Williamson County, San Remo, and how 
the ripeness-removal and Williamson County-San Remo traps came to 
be.  Part II addresses why the Court should fix Williamson County’s 
defects.  Finally, Part III provides a minimalist solution to the ripeness-
removal and Williamson County-San Remo traps: interpret “adequate 
state procedure” to mean any non-judicial state procedure that can 
provide compensation. 
II. JUST COMPENSATION AND RIPENESS 
A. Williamson County and the Origins of a Ripe Mess 
In 1973, Temple Hill County Estates began developing its 
property after the Williamson County Planning Commission approved 
its development plans.22   In 1977, the Planning Commission changed 
the county’s zoning requirements.23  Though the Planning Commission 
previously approved Temple Hill’s plat submissions, it rejected them 
in 1980.24  Because of the decision, Temple Hill’s land became 
undevelopable.25  Hamilton Bank then foreclosed on the property and  
 
 
 
 20. See Diane S. Sykes, Minimalism & Its Limits, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 17, 17–18 (2015) 
(discussing minimalism during the Roberts Court).  
 21. Cf. id. at 19 (“On a more philosophical level, modern minimalism promotes itself as a 
hedge against judicial supremacy. It calls on judges to go slowly and in small steps.”). 
 22. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City v. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n, 729 F.2d 
402, 403 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. 
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sued the Planning Commission for an unconstitutional regulatory 
taking.26 
The District Court granted a judgment notwithstanding the jury 
verdict for the commission on the takings claim.27  That court held that 
there was no taking, reasoning that Tennessee law estopped the 
Planning Commission from applying the regulation that allegedly 
caused the taking.28  The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that evidence 
supported the jury verdict and finding that there was a taking because 
the Commission denied the bank all economic use of its land for some 
time.29  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether 
“Federal, State, and Local government must pay money damages to a 
landowner whose property allegedly had been ‘taken’ temporarily by 
application of government regulation.”30 
Instead of answering this question, the Court created a novel 
jurisdictional rule for Fifth Amendment claims.  First, the Court 
reasoned that Hamilton Bank’s claim was unripe.31 It said that the bank 
had not received a final decision regarding its zoning ordinance 
because it did not seek variances that would have allowed it to develop 
its land.32  Second, the Court held that a Fifth Amendment claim is 
unripe until the state actor denies just compensation.  If a state 
provides “adequate procedure” to obtain just compensation, property 
owners cannot claim a Fifth Amendment violation until they seek and 
are denied compensation through a state procedure.33  The Court wrote 
that the government violates the Fifth Amendment only when it takes 
property and fails to pay compensation.34  This means takings plaintiffs 
must first seek compensation from the state or local government before 
suing in federal court.35 
Williamson County’s ripeness rule can be distilled into two prongs: 
a plaintiff’s taking claim is unripe until (1) the government makes a 
final decision and (2) the claimant seeks just compensation through an 
adequate state procedure for obtaining compensation and is denied.36 
 
 26. Id. at 403–04. 
 27. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 175. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 183–84. 
 30. Id. at 185. 
 31. Id. at 186 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 195. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Katherine Mims Crocker, Justifying a Prudential Solution to the Williamson County 
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B. San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco 
Property owners immediately felt Williamson County’s effects.  If 
a takings plaintiff complied with Williamson County by seeking 
compensation through state court, then a federal court could not hear 
his case because of claim or issue preclusion.  In other words, a valid 
state court decision prevents a federal court from hearing a case based 
on the same factual scenario. Most circuits declined to create an 
exception to the preclusion rule, even if the plaintiff was forced to go 
through state court to satisfy Williamson County.37  Only the Second 
Circuit constructed an exemption to the preclusion rule when a litigant 
was forced to go through state court litigation.38 
The Supreme Court addressed this circuit split in San Remo. That 
case presented a straightforward question: “Is a Fifth Amendment 
Takings claim barred by issue preclusion based on a judgment denying 
compensation solely under state law which was rendered in a state 
court proceeding that was required to ripen the Federal Takings 
claim?”39  Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens framed the issue 
differently.  He asked whether “federal courts may craft an exception 
to the full faith and credit statute . . . for claims brought under the 
Takings Clause.”40 
In San Remo, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors forbade the 
San Remo Hotel from converting rooms for tourists use without 
reapplying and paying a fee.41  In response, the hotel sued the Board 
for causing a taking.  After San Remo sued in state court, the parties 
stayed the case while the hotel litigated in federal court.42  The Ninth 
Circuit applied Pullman abstention43 to the case, reasoning that the 
 
Ripeness Puzzle, 49 GA. L. REV. 163, 166–68 (2014). 
 37. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Pitkin Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 142 F.3d 1319, 1324 (10th Cir. 
1998) (“We conclude the Williamson ripeness requirement is insufficient to preclude application 
of res judicata and collateral estoppel principles in this case.”); Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass’n 
v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 364–65 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that res judicata bars federal 
takings claim); Peduto v. City of N. Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725, 729 (3d Cir. 1989) (same); but see 
Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299, 1305–06 (11th Cir. 1992) (recognizing a 
limited exception to the applicability of res judicata and collateral estoppel to federal takings 
claims). 
 38. Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 127–28 (2d Cir. 
2003). 
 39. Brief for Petitioner at i, San Remo, 545 U.S. 323, 2005 WL 176427. 
 40. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 326. 
 41. Id. at 329. 
 42. Id. at 330. 
 43. Pullman abstention allows a federal court to decline to hear a lawsuit if a ruling on state 
law could resolve the federal constitutional claim; federal courts should avoid deciding the claim 
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state court’s decision might moot the federal question.44  The Ninth 
Circuit also held that one of the San Remo’s takings claim might be 
unripe because it did not seek compensation in state court through an 
inverse condemnation proceeding.45 
Before returning to state court, San Remo reserved its right to 
reenter federal court through England reservation.46  That reservation 
was created in England v. Louisiana Board of Medical Examiners, 
where the Court held that a party litigating in state court because of 
abstention may reserve the right to bring his federal claim in federal 
court after state litigation concludes.47  The Eastern District of 
Louisiana abstained from hearing England because it found that a state 
court may have resolved the case on state law grounds.48  But after 
receiving an adverse decision in Louisiana state court, the plaintiffs 
sought to return to federal court.49 
The England Court stressed that plaintiffs have a right to sue in 
federal court.50  Justice Brennan wrote, “[T]here are fundamental 
objections to any conclusion that a litigant who has properly invoked 
the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider federal 
constitutional claims can be compelled, without his consent and 
through no fault of his own, to accept instead a state court’s 
determination of those claims.”51  He concluded, “[T]he right of a party 
plaintiff to choose a Federal court where there is a choice cannot be 
properly denied.”52 
San Remo, after losing its state takings claim in the California 
Supreme Court,53 sought to use the England reservation and return to 
litigate its federal takings claim in federal court.  But the district court 
held that issue preclusion prevented San Remo from raising its federal 
claim if it could have been resolved in state court.54  The Ninth Circuit 
upheld the district court’s decision, holding that neither Williamson 
 
until the state court has an opportunity to address the state law issue. Railroad Comm’n of Tex. 
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
 44. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 330. 
 45. Id. at 331. 
 46. Id. 
 47. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 421–22 (1964). 
 48. Id. at 413. 
 49. Id. at 413–14. 
 50. Id. at 415. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
 53. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 87 (Cal. 2002).  
 54. San Remo, 41 P.3d at 91.  
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County, England, nor Pullman affected the court’s full faith and credit 
inquiry.55 
Despite Justice Brennan’s explanation in England that a litigant 
may return to federal court by “making on the state record the 
reservation to the disposition of the entire case by the state courts,”56 
the Court upheld the lower court’s determination.  Justice Stevens 
explained: 
Typical England cases generally involve federal 
constitutional challenges to a state statute that can be 
avoided if a state court construes the statute in a 
particular manner. In such cases, the purpose of 
abstention is not to afford state courts an opportunity 
to adjudicate an issue that is functionally identical to the 
federal question. To the contrary, the purpose of 
Pullman abstention in such cases is to avoid resolving 
the federal question by encouraging a state-law 
determination that may moot the federal controversy.57 
San Remo’s majority also rejected the argument that issue 
preclusion should not apply when plaintiffs are forced into state court.58  
The Court expressly rejected the Second Circuit decision, Santini v. 
Connecticut Hazardous Waste Management Service.  The Second 
Circuit had held that a plaintiff could reserve his claim for federal court 
review if he is forced to sue in state court because of Williamson 
County.59  The court sought a “middle ground” because, “It would be 
both ironic and unfair if the very procedure that the Supreme Court 
required plaintiffs to follow before bringing a Fifth Amendment 
takings claim—a state-court inverse condemnation action—also 
precluded [plaintiffs] from ever bringing a Fifth amendment takings 
claim.”  The court interpreted that, in Williamson County, the Supreme 
Court did not intend “to deprive all property owners in states whose 
takings jurisprudence generally follows federal law (i.e., those to whom  
collateral estoppel would apply) of the opportunity to bring the Fifth 
Amendment takings claim in federal court.”60 
 
 
 55. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 364 F.3d 1088, 1096-98 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
 56. England, 375 U.S. at 339–40 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  
 57. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 339–40 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  
 58. Id. at 341–42. 
 59. Santini, 342 F.3d at 118.  
 60. Id. at 130.  
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But Justice Stevens dismissed the Second Circuit’s argument, 
reasoning that there is no right to have a federal claim vindicated in a 
federal forum.61 
Recognizing the dilemma that the Second Circuit identified, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurrence, joined by three other justices, 
which questioned the logic of Williamson County.  The Chief Justice 
agreed that the full faith and credit statute precluded federal court 
review in San Remo.62  But the Chief Justice was unsure why a claimant 
must seek compensation in state court before going to federal court.63  
He questioned the underlying idea that state courts were better than 
federal courts at resolving land use cases.64  In addition, he observed 
that plaintiffs may bring their land use claims directly to federal court 
if they involve other constitutional rights, like the First Amendment or 
the Equal Protection Clause.65  The Chief Justice insisted that 
Williamson County led to an absurd result and put the Fifth 
Amendment in an inferior constitutional position.  Though he did not 
explicitly call for Williamson County to be overruled, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist suggested that he thought its reasoning was suspect and that 
the Court should reconsider the case.66 
C. The Emergence of the Ripeness-Removal and Williamson 
County-San Remo Traps and the Efforts to Untangle Them. 
After San Remo, the ripeness-removal and Williamson County-
San Remo traps fully formed, making it nearly impossible for takings 
litigants to sue in federal court.  The ripeness-removal trap arises when 
a property owner files a takings claim in state court, following 
Williamson County’s requirements, but the government then removes 
the Fifth Amendment claim to federal court based on subject matter 
jurisdiction.67  Once the case is in federal court, the government argues 
 
 61. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 342 (citing Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 
U.S. 75, 84 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103–04 (1980)). 
 62. Id. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 63. Id. at 349. 
 64. Id. at 350. 
 65. Id. at 350–51 (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 411 (1986); Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 
50 (1976); Vill. of Bele Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)). 
 66. See id (explaining that state courts are competent to adjudicate federal takings doesn’t 
explain why federal courts should be restrained from hearing just compensation cases). 
 67. Indeed, local government lawyers have not hesitated to use the ripeness-removal trap 
against property owners. See, e.g., Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 547–48; Mecouch v. Pension Bd. of the 
Employee’s Retirement Systems of the Cty. of Milwaukee, 184 F.Supp.3d 684, 689 (E.D. Wisc. 
2016); Gelnett v. Twp. of Chapman, 2015 WL 7454757 at *1 (M.D. Penn. Nov. 24, 2015). 
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that the landowner’s case must be dismissed because the litigant has 
not used an adequate procedure for obtaining compensation.  Often, 
courts hold that these cases are unripe because the litigant did not go 
through state court to seek just compensation.68  This is so even though 
the property is only in federal court because the government removed 
their case.69 
The Williamson County-San Remo trap occurs when a takings 
litigant unsuccessfully seeks compensation in state court.70  Because he 
has sought compensation in state court, issue preclusion applies to the 
takings claim and he will be unable to sue in federal court.71  In other 
words, the procedure that ripens a case for federal review also prevents 
federal courts from hearing the issue.72 
Fortunately, for takings litigants, the Supreme Court and circuit 
courts have lessened the impact of these traps. The Court has 
repeatedly held that Williamson County’s ripeness rule is a prudential 
doctrine, not a jurisdictional requirement.73 Jurisdictional 
requirements are constitutionally mandated and must be satisfied 
before a court may hear a case.74 On the other hand, prudential 
requirements are court-developed policies that allow the judiciary to 
decline to hear some cases even where jurisdiction exists.75 Because 
Williamson County is only prudential, a federal court may hear a just 
compensation case even if Williamson County’s requirements are not 
 
 68. See, e.g., Gelnett, 2015 WL 7454757 at *4 (bypassing state court “streamlines litigation by 
dispensing with needless discovery and fact-finding”). 
 69. Id.  
 70. Scott A. Keller, Note, Judicial Jurisdiction Stripping Masquerading as Ripeness: 
Eliminating the Williamson County State Litigation Requirement for Regulatory Takings Claims, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 199, 200 (2006) (“When combined with preclusion doctrines, the Williamson 
County State Litigation prong prevents a substantial majority of takings plaintiffs from litigating 
their claims in federal court.”). 
 71. Issue preclusion is an estoppel doctrine that prevents a person from re-litigating an issue 
that another court has decided. Eli J. Richardson, Taking Issue with Preclusion: Reinventing 
Collateral Estoppel, 65 MISS L.J. 41, 41, 45–47 (1995). Essentially, when the same issue was before 
another court, issue preclusion will apply. This principle is constitutionally mandated per the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 72. See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 351 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (discussing how the Rooker-
Feldman Doctrine could cause a preclusion issue). 
 73. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 560 U.S. 
702, 742 (2010); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733–34 (1997). 
 74. See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[T]he core component of 
standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article 
III”). 
 75. See generally Bradford C. Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional, 64 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 413, 419–26 (2013) (discussing the differences between prudential and jurisdictional 
standing). 
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satisfied.76 Thus, Williamson County’s prudential nature may help 
property owners access federal court without worrying about issue 
preclusion.77 
Because Williamson County is not a constitutional mandate, some 
courts have held that its requirements may be waived.78 The Fourth and 
Sixth Circuits have functionally eliminated the ripeness-removal trap, 
partially by recognizing this rule. In Sansotta, a town removed a takings 
case properly filed in state court to federal court.79 A year after 
removing the case, the town argued that Sansotta’s claim was unripe 
because he did not seek compensation in state court.80 The Fourth 
Circuit rejected the Town’s argument, explaining that it would not 
tolerate gamesmanship.81 The court held that the government waives 
Williamson County’s prudential requirement if it removes a case to 
federal court.82  According to the Fourth Circuit, a defendant cannot 
accede to federal jurisdiction by removing a takings case and then 
argue that the federal court does not have jurisdiction.83  Moreover, 
heavily relying on Sansotta, the Sixth Circuit made a similar holding in 
Lily Investments.84 
By recognizing the waiver rule, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits 
ensure that takings plaintiffs will at least be able to present their claims 
 
 76. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (discussing the difference between prudential and 
jurisdictional standing requirements).  
 77. The futility exception has also weakened Williamson County. That rule allows for 
immediate access to federal court if “recourse to state courts would be futile” because state law 
already resolved an issue. Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651, 
655 (9th Cir. 2003). For instance, in Cedar Point Nursey v. Gould, the court held that the Fifth 
Amendment litigant did not have to comply with Williamson County because California state case 
law already resolved the issue in a disfavorable way. 1:16-cv-00185-LJO-BAM, 2016 WL 1559271, 
at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2016). Because suing in California court would be futile, the court held 
that Williamson County did not apply. Id. (citing Agric. Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, 16 
Cal.3d 392, 411 (1976) for the proposition that an access regulation does not cause a taking under 
the California or United States Constitutions, thus foreclosing recovery in California state court). 
 78. See, e.g., Lily Investments v. City of Rochester, No. 15-2289, 2017 WL 56753 (6th Cir. 
Jan. 5, 2017); Sherman v. Town of Chester, 752 F.3d 554, 554 (2d. Cir. 2014); Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 
533. 
 79. Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 533.  
 80. Id. at 536. 
 81. Id. at 545. 
 82. Id; see also Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(recognizing that cities may waive Williamson County ripening requirements). 
 83. Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 545.  
 84. See id. at 546–47 (“[P]ermitting a state or its political subdivision to assert this 
requirement after the state or its political subdivision has removed the case to federal court would 
allow the state . . . to invoke federal jurisdiction and then object to federal jurisdiction”); Lily 
Investments, 2017 WL 56753 at *7. 
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to some court.  If a takings litigant tries to comply with Williamson 
County by litigating in state court, the court will have jurisdiction to 
hear his takings claim because state courts can have jurisdiction over 
such issues in limited circumstances.85  Alternatively, if the government 
removes a takings claim to federal court, then the government acceded 
to federal review, and that court has jurisdiction. 
However, it is not enough that Williamson County is a prudential 
doctrine or waivable. Too many courts stringently apply Williamson 
County, making it impossible to escape the ripeness-removal and 
Williamson County-San Remo traps.86  Constitutional protections 
should not depend on whether one lives in North Carolina or Indiana.87  
If Leslie and Ben lived in Charlotte, a city located in the Fourth Circuit, 
they could have remained in federal court after Pawnee removed their 
case from state court.  Unfortunately, for Leslie and Ben, Indiana is in 
the Seventh Circuit, which stringently applies Williamson County. 
Accordingly, as things stand, the right to seek just compensation 
depends on what part of the country one lives in. 
III.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROMISE—WHY WILLIAMSON 
COUNTY UNDERMINES OUR CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
AND MUST BE ADDRESSED 
In this section, I highlight why the Court should address 
Williamson County.  First, I discuss the federal court’s’ responsibility 
to hear just compensation cases and how Williamson County 
undermines this duty.  Second, I highlight how Williamson County has 
created a two-track justice system for different constitutional rights.  
Third, I explain how Williamson County discriminates against the 
neediest members of society. 
 
 
 
 85. Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court is Not Supreme, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 979, 994–
95 (2010) (discussing situations in which state courts keep jurisdiction, such as with independent 
state law questions). 
 86. See, e.g., Sunrise Detox V, LLC v. City of White Plains, 769 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(applying Williamson County to an Americans with Disabilities Act case involving a land use 
issue). 
 87. Compare Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 544–50 (explaining why the Fourth Circuit permits waiver 
of Williamson County), with Peters v. Vill. of Clifton, 498 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2007) (rejecting 
argument that Williamson County should not apply because it is prudential, explaining “[t]he 
prudential character of the Williamson County requirements do not, however, give the lower 
federal courts license to disregard them”). 
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A. Williamson County Undermines the Just Compensation 
Clause’s Guarantees and the Federal Judiciary’s Responsibility 
to Hear Just Compensation Cases 
The Fifth Amendment is a self-executing constitutional provision 
that guarantees just compensation whenever the government takes 
someone’s property.88  Government must pay for both physical and 
regulatory takings.89  As with other federal constitutional provisions, 
federal courts seemingly have a responsibility to hear federal 
questions. 
Proponents of Williamson County’s ripeness rule might ask why 
are federal courts responsible for providing a constitutional remedy?  
Certainly, state courts have concurrent responsibility to hear federal 
constitutional claims.90  In San Remo, Justice Stevens noted that issue 
preclusion applies “even when the plaintiff would have preferred not 
to litigate in state court, but was required to do so because of prudential 
rules.”91  Justice Stevens argued that there is no right to litigate in 
federal court, citing Migra v. Warren City School District Board of 
Education and Allen v. McCurry.92 
 
 88. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (“the self-executing character of the 
constitutional provision with respect to compensation . . .” (citing 6 P. Nichols, Eminent Domain 
§ 25.41 (3d rev.ed.1972)); Thomas Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
1630, 1637 (2015) ([T]he Takings Clause includes an anticircumvention principle to the effect that 
the government cannot avoid its obligation to pay compensation by declining to exercise the 
power of eminent domain when in all fairness and justice it should do so.” (citations and quotation 
omitted)). 
 89. A physical taking occurs when the government occupies one’s land. Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (“[A] permanent physical 
occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may 
serve.”). On the other hand, a regulatory taking involves the government imposing a regulation 
that “goes too far” and destroys the value of one’s property. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
323, 415 (1922) (“The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain 
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”). 
 90. Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 624 (1884); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 339 
(1816); Samuel P. Jordan, Reverse Abstention, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1771, 1789 (2012). 
 91. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 342. 
 92. Id. These cases are easily distinguishable though. In Migra, the Court held that a teacher 
who successfully sued the school district she worked for and its administration in state court could 
not bring a Section 1983 suit in federal court based on the same facts later on. Because she has 
already litigated the core facts in state court, she could not now litigate the same issues in federal 
court. Unlike in Migra, San Remo Hotel had the rug pulled under its feet. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 
328 (denying opportunity to reserve claim under England). In Allen, a heroin dealer brought a § 
1983 suit in federal court against the St. Louis Police Department after a police officer violated 
his Fourth Amendment rights. 449 U.S. at 92–93. However, the Supreme Court held that res 
judicata applied to the dealer’s claim because the search and seizure issue had been litigated 
during his state court trial. Thus, the federal judiciary would not provide the dealer a second 
chance to re-litigate his claims because he should have brought his § 1983 claim with his 
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However, even if preclusion properly applied in Migra and Allen, 
federal courts still have a responsibility to resolve federal issues and 
play a necessary role in protecting constitutional rights.93  In its earliest 
days, the Court explained that federal courts bring finality and unity to 
points of contention.94  Article III of the Constitution requires that 
federal courts be able to provide the last word for federal questions.95  
Although state courts play an important role in enforcing 
constitutional rights, federal courts ultimately must define them.96  
When federal courts, namely the Supreme Court, provide the final say 
for constitutional provisions, they ensure that rights are protected 
equally across the country. 
If states are mainly responsible for determining the Fifth 
Amendment’s constitutional minima, some states could provide the 
ability to receive just compensation while others may not.97  Indeed, a 
state judiciary hostile to property rights may provide protections well 
below what the Supreme Court or any other federal court would 
provide.98  Although the Supreme Court could ultimately resolve any 
major conflicts between state courts, the chances of Supreme Court 
review are low.99  Even if the Supreme Court corrects erroneous 
decisions, it may be difficult, if not impossible, for those who have had 
their constitutional rights violated ever to get just compensation. 
 
 
 
 
suppression motion. 
 93. See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 348 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citing Migra and Allen for the 
proposition that preclusion properly applied in San Remo). 
 94. Id. at 348; Michael J. Gerhardt, What’s Old is New Again, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1267, 1283 
(2006) (“While it is true that claimants redirected into state courts by the proposed federal 
measures would still have access to a judicial forum, they would be denied at least two essential 
features of the federal court system—finality and uniformity.”). 
 95. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty & Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1511 (1987). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Compare Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353, 356 (2006) (rejecting economic 
development as a public use), with Kaufmann’s Carousel v. City of Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 
301 A.D.2d 292, 294 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2002) (accepting a broad definition of public use, 
including economic development). 
 98. To be sure, it may be the case that “adequate procedures” are inadequate. State courts 
may use Williamson County’s requirement to avoid hearing land use cases. See Gregory 
Overstreet, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 91, 123–24 (1994) (“The tragic irony of the ripeness 
doctrine a cue from their federal counterparts, claims unripe based on a borrowed.”). 
 99. See Aaron Tang, The Ethics of Opposing Certiorari Before the Supreme Court, 35 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB POL’Y 933, 934–35 (2012). 
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B. Williamson County Creates a Two-Tracked Justice System for 
Constitutional Claims 
Williamson County’s ripeness rule creates barriers for takings 
cases that are not present for other constitutional claims.100  Even when 
courts analyze a law’s constitutionality by looking at local practices, 
there is no blanket ban prohibiting certain constitutional claims from 
being heard in federal court.  Take the Miller test: courts use this test 
to determine whether a work is obscene and not protected by the First 
Amendment.101  In conducting the Miller test, courts look to local 
standards to define “prurient interest” and to state law to determine 
whether a work is patently offensive.102  But they consult national 
standards to determine whether the work of art has any artistic value.103  
Claimants who allege that a city official violated their First 
Amendment right by censoring their works do not have to ripen their 
case in state court.104  This is the case, even though it may be that state 
judges would be in a better position to decide what a prurient interest 
in their communities is.105  If the Supreme Court imposed a state-
litigation rule for Miller claims, there would be shock and criticism.106   
 
 
 
 100. Cf. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 518 (Thomas, J., dissent, 2005) (“The 
Court has elsewhere recognized ‘the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been 
embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic, when the issue is only whether the 
government may search a home. Yet today the Court tells us that we are not to ‘second-guess the 
City’s considered judgments,’ when the issue is, instead, whether the government may take the 
infinitely more intrusive step of tearing down petitioners’ homes.”). 
 101. To be sure, the Miller test is often-criticized. Jessica Fisher, Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Ass’n: “Modern Warfare” On First Amendment Protection of Violent Video Games, 8 
J. BUS. & TECH. L. 525, 546 (2013). Even so, the Miller test is still good law and used to determine 
whether artistic work is obscene and falls outside First Amendment protections. Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. (1973). There are three prongs to this test. First, a court must determine 
whether the work appeals to the prurient interest. Id. at 24. Courts look at local standards to 
determine what the “prurient interest” is. Id. Second, a court must determine whether the work 
depicts in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct or excretory functions. Id. at 24–25 Courts look 
to state law to determine this prong. Id. Third, the court must determine whether the work, taken 
as a whole, lacks any serious literary, scientific, artistic, or political value. Id. at 24. Courts use 
national standards to analyze this prong. Id. 
 102. Id. at 24.  
 103. Id. at 30. 
 104. See generally Eclipse Enter., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63 (2d. Cir. 1997) (no issue when 
the First Amendment claim was first brought in federal district court). 
 105. See id.   
 106. Cf. Michael Kent Curtis, The Fraying Fabric of Freedom: Crisis & Criminal Law in 
Struggles for Democracy & Freedom of Expression, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 89, 94 (2011) 
(discussing English commentary describing free speech as sacred). 
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Commentators would condemn the Court and stress that free speech is 
a fundamental right.107 
Equal protection claims are also not subject to an “adequate state 
procedure” requirement.  The Court could hold that Texas or 
California cannot violate the Equal Protection Clause until one seeks 
all potential state court remedies and those states deny recourse.108  For 
instance, if California has a state constitutional provision that prohibits 
discrimination based on race, the Supreme Court could require a state 
litigant to seek relief in state court first.  The Court could stress the 
important role state courts have in deciding equal protection cases.  
Courts review equal protection claims under either rational basis, 
intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny.109  Each of these standards of 
review requires the state to identify its interest in passing a law.110  
Perhaps state courts should get the first crack at reviewing equal 
protection challenges.  After all, state courts may be better equipped 
to understand the interest proffered by their states.111 
If claimants were forced to litigate equal protection cases in state 
court before going to federal court, commentators would panic.112  This 
 
 107. E.g., Andrew P. Napolitano, A Legal History of National Security & Individual Rights in 
the United States: The Unconstitutional Expansion of Executive Power, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 
396, 553-54 (2014) (“Americans must be vigilant to protect our freedoms”); See also Kevin 
Williamson, Galileo Redux, NATIONAL REVIEW, (Apr. 3, 2016), http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
article/433582/free-speech-climate-science-first-amendment (“The First Amendment was 
expressly designed to protect political speech, the right to criticize one’s government and its 
actions.”). 
 108. Cf. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. at 
194 (explaining that constitution is not violated until just compensation has been sought and 
denied). To be sure, some courts have tried to apply Williamson County when there have been 
allegations of discrimination. Islamic Cmty. Ctr. for Mid Westchester v. City of Yonkers Land 
Pres. Bd., No. 16–CV–7364 VB, 2017 WL 2804997, at 9 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2017). But see Temple 
B’Nai Zion, Inc. v. City of Sunny Isle Beach, 727 F.3d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 2013) (declining to 
apply Williamson County when plaintiff alleges land use decision was born out of discriminatory 
animus).  
 109. Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (discussing 
strict scrutiny); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567-68 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(discussing intermediate scrutiny); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 
(1955) (rational basis). 
 110. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (discussing how all racial classifications 
must undergo strict scrutiny); Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419 (discussing strict scrutiny); Turner Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994); Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (rational basis). 
 111. See, e.g., Brief. for Respondent at 51–58, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) 
(discussing Ohio’s state interest in banning gay marriage against an equal protection challenge). 
 112. Cf. Jesus A. Osete, Voter suppression rears its ugly head, NOGALES INT’L, (Mar. 29, 
2016), http://www.nogalesinternational.com/opinion/guest_opinion/voter-suppression-rears-its-
ugly-head/article_a62ce3e0-f52c-11e5-80ad-7751b9f506e4.html (describing problems with 
invalidating the preclearance measures of the Voting Rights Act, and emphasizing the importance 
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terror would likely have nothing to do with issue or claim preclusion.  
Rather, civil rights advocates would probably decry a state-litigation 
rule for equal protection cases because it would appear that federal 
courts were trying to undermine the substantive protections of the 
Equal Protection Clause.113 
It is hypocritical to condemn limiting access for First or Equal 
Protection Clause claims while arguing that Williamson County’s 
ripeness rule should remain.  Under current doctrine, someone who 
wants to bring a freedom of speech or equal protection claim does not 
have to go through state litigation.114  Yet the Court has not provided 
property owners this same dignity of federal review, even though the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects one’s right to just 
compensation.115 
The state-litigation requirement unfairly relegates the Just 
Compensation Clause to second-class status.116  Because the Just 
Compensation Clause is like any other constitutional protection, it 
should be treated that way absent a compelling argument to the 
contrary.117  The Court has not made the affirmative case for the state-
litigation requirement.118 
 
of voting rights), with Ian Millhiser, When John Roberts Said Enough Racism in America to Justify 
the Voting Rights Act, THINKPROGRESS, (Jun. 18, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/ 
2015/06/18/3671107/two-years-ago-supreme-court-said-isnt-enough-racism-justify-voting-rights-
act/ (describing problems with invalidating some measures of the Voting Rights Act). 
 113. Cf. Jeffrey Toobin, Justice Scalia’s Shameful Joke, NEW YORKER, (Apr. 28, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/on-gay-marriage-its-not-scalias-court 
(criticizing Justice Scalia’s tone during argument for Obergefell v. Hodges); Michael Keegan, 
Cleaning up the Supreme Court’s Democracy Mess, HUFFINGTON POST, (Aug. 25, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-b-keegan/cleaning-up-the-supreme-c_b_5529257.html 
(criticizing the Court’s invalidation of a provision of the Voting Rights Act). 
 114. To be sure, some courts have applied Williamson County to any case in which land use is 
involved. These cases simply highlight the absurdity of the Williamson County ripeness rule. It is 
not apparent to the author what state court litigation does to ripen an Americans with Disabilities 
Act case. See generally Eclipse Enters., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63 (no issue when the First 
Amendment claim was first brought in federal district court). 
 115. See Chicago, Burlington & Quality R.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (the Court 
found that nominal payment for a public right of way over a railroad was not a denial of the equal 
protection rights of the railroad company). 
 116. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) (comparing takings clause with 
other constitutional provisions). 
 117. See id. (“We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a 
part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to 
the status of a poor relation in these comparable circumstances.”). 
 118. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and Cty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 351(2005) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring) (“the Court has not explained why we should hand authority over federal takings 
claims to state courts . . . while allowing plaintiffs to proceed directly to federal court in cases 
involving, for example, challenges to municipal land-use regulations based on the First 
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C. Williamson County Creates a Two-Tracked Justice system for 
the Have and Have-Nots 
Aside from treating constitutional protections differently, 
Williamson County creates a two-tracked justice system between the 
wealthy and the rest of society.  Many homeowners, like Leslie and 
Ben, do not have the resources to deal with local governments’ 
litigation gamesmanship.  Litigation is expensive and most people have 
finite resources.119 At some point, rational people will simply give up 
because it will no longer be worth defending their rights, thus putting 
a de facto expiration date on the Takings Clause.120 
The ripeness-removal trap contributes to a two-track justice 
system for the poor and the wealthy.  First, property owners will 
generally be at a disadvantage litigating against the government 
because the government usually has more resources.121  Second, 
because property owners are suing the government under the Fifth 
Amendment, the government can remove their case to federal court.122  
Moreover, once a property owner is in federal court, most circuits allow 
the government to send the plaintiff back to state court because of 
Williamson County.123  While the government may be able to 
financially afford this litigation, many property owners are unable to 
do so.124 
Not all Fifth Amendment litigants will be at a disadvantage.  The 
wealthy can afford to vindicate their rights while the average person 
will struggle to pay their legal bills.125  The wealthy will have an easier 
 
Amendment”). 
 119. Art Wittich, Are Private Property Rights an Endangered Species in Montana?, 21 MONT. 
LAW. 3, 3 (Apr. 1996). 
 120. But see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 553 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (“Were we to accept the 
State’s rule, the [post enactment] transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to 
defend any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be 
allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause.”). 
 121. See Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial Taking or Due Process?, 97 
CORNELL L. REV. 305, 328–31 (2012) (discussing tool of judicial takings that government may 
use). 
 122. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012). 
 123. See, e.g., Gelnett, 2015 WL 7454757. 
 124. Cf. Palazzolo, 553 U.S. at 627 (2001) (explaining that the takings clause should not have 
an expiration date).  
 125. Compare Gillian B. White, Inequality Between America’s Rich and Poor Is at a 30-Year 
High, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/ 
2014/12/inequality-21 (explaining that wealth inequality is increasing); with Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (discussing how without legal aid for the poor, many 
indigent individuals may be “‘put on a trial without a proper charger, and convicted upon 
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible’ in the 
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time complying with the state-litigation requirement and a better 
chance at ultimately entering federal court.  Indeed, the wealthy may 
not even have to face eminent domain proceedings in the first place.126  
For instance, if a city is aware of a person’s assets and the possibility of 
a prolonged legal battle, they might be reluctant to take any actions 
that may cause a taking.  Instead, the government might prefer to target 
politically and economically vulnerable property owners because 
minorities and the poor make easier targets.127 
IV.  TOWARDS A SENSIBLE RESOLUTION OF WILLIAMSON 
COUNTY’S TRAPS 
To provide a solution for Williamson County’s traps, this section 
proceeds in three parts.  In the first section, I provide a roadmap for 
litigators to generate a case that would allow the Court to narrow 
Williamson County.  In the second section, I explain how this 
minimalist solution undoes the Williamson County-San Remo and 
ripeness-removal traps—the two main problems discussed in this 
article.  Finally, the third section briefly explains how the Court may 
respond if lower courts resist a narrowed Williamson County decision. 
A. The Minimalist Solution to the Williamson County Dilemma 
The major challenge in undoing Williamson County’s problems 
has been getting the Court to reexamine the case.128  Since San Remo 
was decided, creating the Williamson County-San Remo trap, the 
Supreme Court has had many chances to revisit Williamson County, 
but has declined to do so.129  Arrigoni is the most recent denial and the 
 
criminal procedure context” (citation omitted)). 
 126. ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS 
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 83 (The University of Chicago Press ed., 2015). 
 127. See Ryan Merriman, Closing Pandora’s Box: Proposing a Statutory Solution to the 
Supreme Court’s Failure to Adequately Protect Private Property, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1345–
46 (2012) (“Liberals, on the other hand, object to the disproportionate impact economic-
development takings have on minorities and the poor.”); Paul Boudreaux, Eminent Domain, 
Property Rights, and the Solution of Representation Reinforcement, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 47 
(2005) (explaining that cities are more likely to condemn the homes of poor and minority 
communities if they “are concerned with improving their tax bases, [because] it simply is not 
economical to pay attention to the needs or desires of the poor.”). 
 128. Circuit courts could minimize Williamson County’s effects on property owners, but 
generally have not done so. But see Sansotta, 724 F.3d 533 (applying waiver rule); Guggenheim, 
638 F.3d at 1116–18 (applying Williamson County in a narrow manner). 
 129. See, e.g., Arrigoni, 136 S. Ct. 1409; Kurtz v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1156 (2015) 
(denial of certiorari); see also J. David Breemer, Ripeness Madness: The Expansion of Williamson 
County’s Baseless “State Procedures” Takings Ripeness Requirement to Non-Takings Claims, 41 
URB. L. 615, 616 n.11 (2009) (listing cases denying certiorari, asking Court to revisit Williamson 
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closest the Supreme Court has come to addressing Williamson 
County,130  but only two Justices expressed interest in revisiting the 
case.  Thus, for those who are concerned about Williamson County’s 
effects, it is necessary to find the best way to get two more votes in 
support of certiorari.131 
Many commentators have called for the Court to overrule 
Williamson County,132 and after San Remo, those calls have 
increased.133  Because of Justice Thomas’s dissent in Arrigoni, property 
right advocates may feel emboldened to push the Court to overrule 
Williamson County.134  They should seek to have the case overruled.  It 
is worth considering other ways to undo Williamson County’s damage 
without asking the Court to take the extraordinary step of overruling 
the case.135 
B. The Court and Minimalism 
A problem for takings litigants seeking to overrule Williamson 
County is that the Court is a minimalist institution.  This has been 
especially true since Chief Justice Roberts took the bench.136  
“Minimalists try to decide cases rather than to set down broad rules; 
they ask that decisions be narrow rather than wide.”137  This theory 
requires jurists to decide no more than they must to ensure the 
resolution of a case.138  One common trait of a minimalist court is that 
 
County). 
 130. Arrigoni, 136 S. Ct. at 1409. 
 131. Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500 (1957), rev’d sub nom. Herdman v. Penn. R.R. 
Co., 352 U.S. 518, 519−20 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (discussing the “rule of four” to 
grant certiorari). 
 132. See Bernick, supra note 18, at 66 (citing law review articles calling for the Court to 
readdress Williamson County). 
 133. Keller, supra note 70, at 241 (“After the State Litigation prong is seen as judicial 
jurisdiction stripping masquerading as ripeness, this Note argues that the U.S. Supreme Court 
should eliminate the Williamson County State Litigation prong.”). 
 134. See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, Great Dissent!, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (Apr. 25, 2016), 
http://gideonstrumpet.info/2016/04/great-dissent/ (endorsing the dissent); Robert H. Thomas, 
Quagmire Unabated: SCOTUS will Not Revisit Williamson County (Yet), INVERSE 
CONDEMNATION (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/ 
2016/04/scotus-will-not-revisit-williamson-county-yet.html (endorsing the dissent). 
 135. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2652 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining that 
“special justifications needed to reverse an opinion must go beyond demonstrations (much less 
assertions) that it was wrong; that is the very point of stare decisis” in the context of potentially 
overruling case requiring compulsory union dues for collective bargaining). 
 136. Sykes, supra note 20, at 31 (discussing Chief Justice Roberts’s preference to use 
minimalist techniques to avoid conflicts with the political branches). 
 137. Cass Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1996). 
 138. Id. at 6. 
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it will decline to overrule previous cases, abiding by stare decisis to 
promote stability and predictability of the law.139 
One theory suggests that denying certiorari is a form of 
minimalism.140  Professor Cass Sunstein is the most notable proponent 
of this theory.141  He argues that the Court may deny certiorari when it 
wants more information about the legal facts of a case, when it is 
prudent to wait before addressing a major issue, or when it is trying to 
avoid issuing an incorrect decision.142  As Professor Sunstein observes, 
“Denials are reasonless.  They are entirely rule-free and 
untheorized.”143  Because denial of certiorari is the easiest way to leave 
a case undecided, it is appropriately characterized as a form of 
minimalism. 
Knowing the Supreme Court is a minimalist institution, and 
assuming denying certiorari is a form of minimalism, takings litigants 
probably should not ask the Court to overrule Williamson County.144  
If a litigant does so, the Court may follow its minimalist tradition and 
simply deny review.  For this reason, many recent property rights cases 
before the Court have merely asked the Court to refine its prior 
decisions.145  For example, San Remo was the last case in which the 
Court discussed Williamson County in significant detail.146  There, the 
petition only asked whether issue preclusion applied under that precise 
factual scenario.147 
Given that the Court likes to act in a minimalist fashion, the next 
step for those seeking to undo Williamson County’s damage is to find—
or design—a case that would limit Williamson County and San Remo’s 
reach, but does not ask the Court to overrule either case.  The ideal 
case would feature a petitioner that had plausibly complied with the 
ripeness requirements, but did not litigate in state court.  If a petitioner 
had tried to comply with Williamson County, the Court may be more 
 
 139. Sykes, supra note 20, at 19. 
 140. Sunstein, supra note 137, at 15. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 51. 
 143. Id. at 22. 
 144. Certainly, one can list many cases over the last decade in which the Supreme Court 
explicitly overruled its prior cases, but none of these involve property rights. 
 145. See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (distinguishing case from other public use suits); San Remo, 
545 U.S. 323 (not asking the Court to overrule Williamson County). 
 146. Although the Court did discuss Williamson County in Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2609, 
it only discussed the prudential nature of the decision; it did not address Williamson County’s 
tension with other doctrines. 
 147. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, San Remo Hotel, at ii (Question Presented), available at 
https://www.smallprop.org/downloads/SanRemoPetition.pdf. 
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likely to grant certiorari because it allows them to simply reject an 
overly broad reading of the adequate state procedure requirement.148  
Litigants like Leslie and Ben—a middle-class couple who tried to 
comply with the abstruse legal requirements—may appear especially 
sympathetic.149 
C. Using Williamson County’s Language to Design a Minimalist 
Case 
To find the best “cert-worthy” case, it is useful to start with 
Williamson County’s plain language.  According to Justice Blackmun, 
aggrieved property owners must “seek compensation through the 
procedures the state has provided for doing so.”150  “[I]f a State 
provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the 
property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation 
Clause until [he] has used the procedure and been denied just 
compensation.”151 What constitutes “an adequate procedure” is not 
defined in Williams County, but a few observations are noteworthy.  
Justice Blackmun never says that “adequate procedure” requires state 
court litigation, like so many circuit courts have claimed.152  Moreover, 
“an” and “procedure” are singular terms, suggesting that property 
owners need only pursue one procedure. 
An attractive minimalist case would involve a takings litigant who 
used a non-judicial, state-sanctioned procedure provided for obtaining 
compensation instead of seeking compensation through state court.  
After being denied compensation through this procedure, the litigant 
 
 148. Indeed, the Court has recently taken the opportunity to narrow extremely broad 
readings of other statues. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2371−72 (2016) (rejecting 
broad interpretation of the Hobbs Act); Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1088−89 (2015) 
(rejecting broad interpretation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act); Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 
2090 (2014) 
(rejecting broad interpretation of the Convention of the Prohibition of Development and Use of 
Chemical Weapons). Although these cases have other elements that are not an issue in takings 
cases, such as the rule of lenity and criminal law issues, it is still useful to see how the Court resolve 
tricky issues. Statutory interpretation cases are especially useful for this article because I suggest 
the Court engage in a pseudo-statutory interpretation of its prior opinion. 
 149. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: 
Jurisprudential Consideration in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 389, 395 
(2004) (“At a more concrete level, the choice of a particular case, with its peculiar set of facts, 
among the many that are generally available to resolve an issue can influence the scope and 
content of the Court’s opinion on the merits—and possibly the outcome.”). 
 150. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194. 
 151. Id. at 195 (emphasis added). 
 152. See, e.g., Save More Food Mkts, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., No. 16-cv-447-jdp, 2016 
WL 4131866 (W.D. Wisc. Aug 3, 2016). 
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seeks compensation in federal court.  Then, after a circuit court holds 
that the takings litigant’s claim is not yet ripe, because he has not 
sought compensation in a state court, he petitions for certiorari with a 
question presented similar to this, “Whether a non-judicial state 
procedure, in which a property owner applies to a state agency to 
obtain just compensation for a taking, is an adequate procedure for 
obtaining compensation that satisfies Williamson County’s ripeness 
requirements.”153 
This question presented does not ask the Supreme Court to 
overrule its prior case, and it allows the Court to make a narrow ruling.  
All the Court must answer is whether the petitioner complied with 
Williamson County’s requirements.154  If it holds that the non-judicial 
procedure satisfies Williamson County’s requirements, it would 
eliminate the state-court litigation requirement.155  This ruling would 
confirm what commentators and jurists have been saying for decades: 
State courts do not need to review a takings claim before a Takings 
Clause violation is ripe.156  Additionally, the Court would not be 
breaking new ground; some courts have held that “an ‘adequate 
process’ for state compensation can also be administrative relief such 
as a state claims commission which awards monetary damages.”157 
One lingering difficulty is that “adequate procedure for seeking 
compensation” is still vague.  To cure Williamson County’s defects, “an 
adequate procedure” will have two components: (1) it must be non-
judicial, and (2) it should be a procedure that allows the municipality 
to provide compensation.  A good rule of thumb for the first prong 
would be to ask whether the procedure was created by the legislature, 
such as an agency, commission, or board.158  If the procedure was 
 
 153. Whether the Court would grant certiorari is certainly a different question. The Court will 
typically look to resolve circuit splits or questions of national importance.  Sup. Ct. R. 10. Arrigoni 
suggests that two justices see resolving Williamson County’s litigation trap as an important 
question. But to make this case “cert-worthy,” it may take more strategic litigation throughout 
the country to create a circuit split. 
 154. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012) (applying full faith and credit statute in full judicial 
proceedings). 
 155. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“It is not clear to me that 
Williamson County was correct in demanding that, once a government entity has reached a final 
decision with respect to a claimant’s property, the claimant must seek compensation in state court 
before bringing a federal takings claim in federal court.”); Overstreet, supra note 98, at 118–20. 
 156. Overstreet, supra note 98, at 118–20. 
 157. Id. at 118 (citing MAK Co. v. Smith, 763 F. Supp. 1003, 1005 (W.D. Ark. 1991)). 
 158. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 17 (4th pocket ed. 2011) (defining “administrative 
proceeding” as “A hearing, inquiry, investigation, or trial before an administrative agency, usu. 
adjuratory in nature but sometimes quasi-legislative.”). 
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created by the legislature, that non-judicial procedure would likely 
satisfy the first prong.159 The procedure must be non-judicial to avoid 
issue preclusion.160  As to the second prong, courts should understand 
compensation to be a payment to recoup for a loss.161  Thus, a takings 
litigant would satisfy Williamson County’s requirement when he seeks 
a monetary payment for a taking from an agency, commission, or 
board. 
Several examples of what should be adequate state procedures 
might help illustrate what would ripen a case for federal review.162  For 
instance, the California Tort Claims Act would probably be an 
adequate procedure.163  The law provides governmental entities and 
takings plaintiffs a chance to negotiate a settlement for an alleged 
taking.164 
For example, say Sacramento, California declares that a plot of 
land is an environmentally sensitive zone, thus preventing its property 
owner from building anything on their plot.165  Because Sacramento has 
denied all economically viable use of their land, the property owner 
wants to file a per se takings claim.166  Knowing Williamson County’s 
requirements, the property owner first seeks compensation from a 
board that Sacramento established to negotiate settlements for inverse 
condemnation claims.  If Sacramento’s board pays compensation, 
everyone is better off.  The owner is paid, Sacramento does not have 
to litigate, and the federal dockets remain clear.  If the city declines to 
 
 159. Cf. id. at 416 (defining “judicial” as “Of, relating to, or by the court or a judge.”). 
 160. See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 347 (“Whatever the merits of that concern may be, we are not 
free to disregard the full faith and credit statute solely to preserve the availability of a federal 
forum.”). 
 161. See generally Tim Kowal, The Restitutionary Approach to Just Compensation, 9 Chap. L. 
Rev. 463, 466–74 (2006) (arguing for a broader conception of the Just Compensation Clause to 
include restitution payments). 
 162. One notable circuit case is Temple B’Nai Zion, Inc. v. City of Sunny Isles Beach, 727 F.3d 
1349, 1359 (11th Cir. 2013). There, the Eleventh Circuit explained that “the record is sufficiently 
developed—thanks in part to two lengthy quasi-judicial hearings held before the Preservation 
Board and the City Commission—that the issues we today deem ripe are clearly primed and at 
the ready for judicial resolution.” Id. (emphasis added). My suggestion is to hold that non-judicial 
remedies are sufficient; but quasi-judicial remedies would also remove the ripeness-removal and 
the Williamson County-San Remo traps because there still would be no final agency decision. 
 163. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 935–935.2 (2012). 
 164. Id. 
 165. See PLF clients win in settlement with Tahoe agency, Pac. Legal Found. (Dec. 10, 2015), 
https://pacificlegal.org/plf-clients-win-in-settlement-with-tahoe-agency/ (informing that TRPA 
was sued for “taking” a couple’s property). 
 166. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 (declaring when a property owner is denied all economically 
viable use of their property, it is a per se taking). 
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pay compensation, then the property owner’s claim would be ripe 
under Williamson County because he has sought compensation 
through an adequate state procedure. 
The administrative appeal provided in Mecouch v. Pension Board 
of the Employee’s Retirement System is also illustrative of a procedure 
for seeking compensation that should satisfy Williamson County’s 
requirements.167  In that case, George Mecouch purchased “service 
credits” from the Pension Board of the County of Milwaukee to ensure 
that his retirement benefits would vest.168  After receiving confirmation 
that his retirement benefits would vest, Mecouch retired. Twenty-five 
years later (and four years after he had started drawing a pension), the 
pension board informed him that it had improperly allowed him to 
purchase service credits.169  Thus, the pension board suspended his 
pension.170   Mecouch sought to have the pension board reinstate his 
payments.171 First, Mecouch sought to have his payments reinstated 
through the pension board’s appeal process.172  The appeal board did 
not restore his payments,173 although it did say that Mecouch’s claim 
was ready for judicial review.174 
Because the board informed the litigant that, “he was entitled to 
seek judicial review,” his claim should be ripe for review in state or 
federal court.175  The procedure was enough to secure compensation 
because if the board had agreed with Mecouch, his money would have 
been returned and his takings argument rendered moot.  Because 
Mecouch used a procedure that could have provided him all the relief 
he was seeking, his claim should have been ripe under this proposed 
test.176 
On the other hand, commentators who have called for Williamson 
County to be overruled may not be satisfied with narrowing it.  
Property rights advocates may argue that this procedure is 
unnecessary, noting—and correctly so—that a landowner suffers a 
 
 167. Mecouch, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 684. 
 168. Id. at 686. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 690. To be sure, the Western District of Wisconsin held that Mecouch’s claim was 
not ripe because his case had not been ripened through state court procedures because 
Wisconsin’s constitution provides a takings claim. Id.  
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taking as soon as any government official denies just compensation.177  
These advocates may argue that any minimalist case should 
acknowledge when a constitutional injury occurs. 
This minimalist decision would recognize the scope of a 
constitutional injury and recognize that federal courts need flexibility.  
Courts see many meritless takings claims.  Pro se litigants—and some 
low-quality attorneys—often sue cities for takings under strained 
theories.178  Many pro se litigants poorly design their cases, causing 
their suits to burden an already overworked judiciary.179  By keeping a 
requirement for takings plaintiffs to use a non-judicial state procedure, 
lower courts provide these plaintiffs a reliable way to get compensation 
while relieving pressure on federal judges.  In addition, if a plaintiff 
fails to get compensation, through a state non-judicial procedure, they 
can then go to federal court. 
The minimalist solution also would not undo Williamson County’s 
prudential nature.  If a landowner suffers an egregious taking and files 
a well-crafted complaint, and the facts are well developed, a federal 
court may choose to hear the case immediately without requiring him 
to seek compensation through a non-judicial procedure.180  By 
narrowing “an adequate procedure for receiving compensation” to a 
single state non-judicial procedure, the Court would provide federal 
courts maximum flexibility while protecting property rights. 
 
 
 177. J. David Breemer, You Can Check Out But You Can Never Leave: The Story of the San 
Remo Hotel - The Supreme Court Relegates Federal Takings Claims to State Courts Under a Rule 
Intended to Ripen the Claims for Federal Review, 33 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 247, 291 (2006) (citing 
Berger & Kanner, supra note 15, at 694) (“The fundamental principle underlying this 
conclusion—that an action for a taking exists only if the challenged invasion of private property 
occurs ‘without just compensation’—is not controversial, but the conclusion that compensation 
can be deemed lacking only after state court litigation is dubious.”). 
 178. See, e.g., Jackson v. Vill. of Western Springs, No. 14 C 3414, 2014 WL 5543844 (N.D. Ill. 
Nov. 3, 2014); Jarvis-Orr v. Twp. Of Hartford, No. 1:11-CV-1066, 2012 WL 6737740 (W.D. Mich. 
Nov. 30, 2012); Moes v. Woodward, Nos. 1:11-CV-912, 1:12-CV-1092, 2012 WL 5830596 (W.D. 
Mich. Nov. 16, 2012). 
 179. See, e.g., Jackson, 2014 WL 5543844, at *1 (“The 100–page, 447–paragraph Complaint is 
hard to follow, but it appears that all of Jackson’s claims are related to these zoning decisions and 
the Defendants’ activities surrounding the decisions.”); Jennifer Bendery, Federal Judges are 
Burned Out, Overworked And Wondering Where Congress Is, HUFFINGTON POST, (Sep. 30, 
2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/judge-federal-courts-vacancies_us_55d77721 
e4b0a40aa3aaf14b (last visited Oct. 29, 2017) (describing how one federal judge works up to 75 
hours a week and at least one full day every weekend to keep up with workload). 
 180. Along with Mecouch, consider Bendorf v. Ojai Basin Groundwater Mgmt. Agency, No. 
CV 11-3877-DSF SP, 2012 WL 3867352 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2012). The plaintiffs filed a pro se 
complaint after trying to work through the issues with local agencies. That said, the court in 
Bendorf dismissed the case because the pro se plaintiff had not complied with Williamson County. 
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Though Williamson County has caused much heartache for 
property owners and their advocates, the Supreme Court does not 
seem eager to revisit the case.181  Thus, it is necessary to present a case 
that would attract the Court’s attention.  An ideal case may be one in 
which a takings litigant used a non-judicial state procedure, such as the 
California Tort Claims Act, to obtain compensation, but was still 
denied access to the federal courts because he did not seek 
compensation in state court.  Such a case would highlight how a good 
actor who tried to comply with the Court’s strict requirements could 
not get relief, even after complying.  To limit Williamson County’s 
damage, takings plaintiffs should leave an opening for the Court to 
reject the state-court litigation requirement without overruling 
Williamson County. 
D. Rejecting the State Litigation Rule Would Eliminate the 
Ripeness-Removal and Williamson County-San Remo Traps 
The immediate benefit from this ruling is that it would eliminate 
the Williamson County-San Remo and ripeness-removal traps.  If a 
state procedure, such as the California Tort Claim Act, ripens a 
landowner’s case, then issue preclusion will never arise because using 
these procedures does not result in a final judgment.  Additionally, 
federal courts could continue to decline to hear poorly developed or 
nonsensical takings claims.182  Landowners will also no longer fall prey 
to unfair gamesmanship tactics.  In other words, eliminating the 
Williamson County-San Remo trap through my minimalist proposal 
ensures that property owners do not resort to federal courts as a first 
stop, but it still guarantees that property owners will be able to access 
the federal judiciary, while preserving judicial discretion to prevent 
docket overrun.183 
In addition, holding that a state non-judicial procedure could 
satisfy Williamson County would also eliminate the ripeness-removal 
 
 181. See Arrigoni, 136 S. Ct. at 1412 (dissenting from denial of certiorari, even though the case 
appeared to be an appropriate vehicle to resolve the Justices’ individual concerns about 
Williamson County). 
 182. See, e.g., Jackson v. Vill. of Western Springs, No. 14 C 3414, 2014 WL 5543844 (N.D. Ill. 
Nov. 3, 2014); Jarvis-Orr v. Twp. Of Hartford, No. 1:11-CV-1066, 2012 WL 6737740 (W.D. Mich. 
Nov. 30, 2012); Moes v. Woodward, Nos. 1:11-CV-912, 1:12-CV-1092, 2012 WL 5830596 (W.D. 
Mich. Nov. 16, 2012). 
 183. To be sure, district courts often deal with meritless cases about a wide range of issues. 
See, e.g., Seed.S of Ibrahim Corp. v. Comm. of Pa., CIV.A. No. 88-4329, 1988 WL 131380 (E.D. 
Pa. Dec. 7, 1988). It is simply unclear why courts single out takings claim. If a frivolous claim is 
filed, courts should simply dismiss the case rather than apply an odd work around. 
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trap.  This would prevent governments from using Williamson County 
as a stalling tactic. If a takings litigant seeks compensation through a 
non-judicial state procedure, then the government cannot seek 
removal because the case is not in court.184  After a takings litigant uses 
a non-judicial procedure for seeking compensation, the litigant’s claim 
would be ripe, and he could sue immediately in federal court.185  
Alternatively, if a takings plaintiff sues in state court and has his case 
removed to federal court, he would not be sent back to state court for 
failing to satisfy Williamson County because he satisfied Williamson 
County by seeking compensation through a state non-judicial 
procedure.186 
Thus, a narrow holding that a state non-judicial procedure can 
satisfy Williamson County would undo the Williamson County-San 
Remo trap.  After compensation is denied in a state non-judicial 
procedure, a takings claim would be ripe for judicial review.187  A 
municipality also could not argue that issue preclusion applies because 
there is no final state court judgment, as was the case in San Remo.188  
Thus, allowing the litigant to keep his suit in federal court would not 
violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
To be sure, Williamson County would retain the prudential 
exception for when a municipality engages in gamesmanship or a case 
is well-developed,189 and the futility exception would still apply.190  By 
using minimalism and holding that a state non-judicial procedure 
satisfies Williamson County, the Supreme Court could undo the 
Williamson County-San Remo and ripeness-removal traps. 
 
 
 184. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (removal only applies to case filed in state court). 
 185. See Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 195 (discussing adequate procedures for providing 
compensation). 
 186. See supra Section IV.A. 
 187. Id. 
 188. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 336 (“The modern version of the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, 
provides that judicial proceedings shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within 
the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of 
such State.”) (quotations and citations omitted). 
 189. See Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates, 353 F.3d at 655 (“The plaintiff must have obtained 
a final decision from the governmental authority charged with implementing the regulations and 
must have pursued compensation through state remedies unless doing so would be futile.”). 
 190. See Adam Bros. Farming, Inc. v. Cty. of Santa Barbara, 604 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 
2010) (“As this case raises only prudential concerns, we have the discretion to waive the 
requirements of Williamson County, assume that ripeness is met and continue with our 
analysis.”). 
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E. What if Lower Courts or Municipal Governments Continue to 
Abuse Williamson County? 
Even if the Supreme Court holds that a non-judicial state 
procedure can be an “adequate state procedure”—thus rejecting state 
court litigation as a necessary ripening procedure—lower courts may 
resist.  They may hold that objectively reasonable state non-judicial 
procedures for obtaining compensation do not satisfy Williamson 
County’s requirements.191  This would continue to distort Williamson 
County.  Some judges surely would resist changing Williamson County 
because its requirements bar a category of cases from federal court, 
thus lowering the courts’ case loads.192 
Though the minimalist ruling I propose may lead to courts 
distorting Williamson County, the Supreme Court’s watchful eye 
would dissuade lower courts and municipalities from playing games.  In 
his recent dissent from denial in Arrigoni, Justice Thomas suggested 
that the Court knew that Williamson County has spawned “confusion 
in the lower courts”193 and “inspire[d] gamesmanship in the lower 
courts.”194  Chief Justice Rehnquist also argued in his San Remo 
concurrence that the state litigation requirement is nonsensical.  Thus, 
it would be unwise for lower courts to further distort Williamson 
County if the Court corrected some of the problems that Justice 
Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist identified, yet left Williamson 
County breathing. 
If lower courts continue to distort Williamson County, the 
Supreme Court could overrule it.  This would be consistent with the 
Court’s practice of narrowing, questioning, and weakening its 
precedents before overruling them.195  In recent years, the Court has 
first issued a narrow ruling before issuing broad decisions in cases 
 
 191. Indeed, some courts have done so in other similar land use cases. See, e.g., Cal. Bldg. 
Indus. Assoc. v. San Jose, 189 Cal. 4th 435 (2015) (rejecting theory of legislative exaction, despite 
strong precedents of Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013), Dolan, 
512 U.S. 374, Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 485 U.S. 825 (1987) (supporting that theory); see 
also Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of 
certiorari) (“For at least two decades, however, lower courts have divided over whether the 
Nollan/Dolan test applies in cases where the alleged taking arises from a legislatively imposed 
condition rather than an administrative one.”). 
 192. Cf. Grace E. D’Alo, Reflections on Pennsylvania’s ADR Community: Paradise, 
Pragmatism, & Progress, 108 Penn St. L. Rev. 309, 310 (2003) (discussing general desire from 
courts to decrease their caseload, and using alternative dispute resolution methods to do so). 
 193. Arrigoni, 136 S. Ct. at 1411  
 194. Id. at 1409. 
 195. Compare N.W. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009), with 
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
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involving campaign finance, voting rights, and gay marriage.  The 
Court may do the same in a land use case if it is forced to revisit 
Williamson County after making a minimalist decision. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Over the past three decades, Williamson County has caused 
property owners much heartache.  Takings litigants often try to comply 
with Williamson County’s requirements, only to find themselves caught 
in either the ripeness-removal or Williamson County-San Remo traps.  
This result is unjust because it deprives property owners of a forum to 
vindicate their basic constitutional rights; property rights are not 
secondary.  Williamson County may also cause local governments to 
target poorer individuals for takings.  Fortunately for property owners, 
some members of the Supreme Court are ready to review Williamson 
County, though a few more votes are needed before certiorari is 
granted. 
To encourage the Supreme Court, property rights advocates 
should craft an attractive case.  Based on the Court’s current 
composition, it is best to present the Court with the opportunity to 
make a minimalist ruling.  In the Williamson County context, this 
means that property owners should present a case that asks the 
Supreme Court whether a non-judicial state procedure for seeking 
compensation, like the California Tort Claims Act, satisfies Williamson 
County’s requirements.  If the Court holds that it does, it would 
eliminate any notion that state court litigation is necessary to satisfy 
Williamson County.  This would also undo the Williamson County-San 
Remo and ripeness-removal traps. 
Even with a positive ruling, there is more to be done.  Williamson 
County has two prongs.  This article solely focused on the second 
prong: determining what an adequate state procedure is.  Even after 
narrowing the adequate state procedure prong, the Court should still 
solve the issues of the finality prong, which is not discussed in this 
article.196 
The Court would eliminate several hurdles for landowners by 
narrowing Williamson County.  My solution would normalize how 
property rights are treated in the United States. Both liberal and 
conservative jurists recognize that property rights are a fundamental 
 
 196. See Overstreet, supra note 98, at 98–100 (discussing MacDonald, Sommer, & Frates v. 
Cty. of Yolo, 473 U.S. 340 (1986) and the “meaningful application” and “reapplication” process 
in determining whether a county decision is final). 
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aspect of the Constitution.197  Interpreting adequate procedure for 
obtaining compensation to include non-judicial state procedures would 
help put property rights on equal footing with other rights. 
 
 197. See, e.g., Arrigoni, 136 S. Ct. at 1411 (Justice Thomas criticizing the court for 
transforming property rights into a secondary right); Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012) (“The Takings Clause is designed to bar Government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole.”) (citation and quotation omitted). 
